

The Seven-Figure Pay Gap: A Structural Analysis of Professional Compensation

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Abstract

This research brief examines a proposition that contradicts conventional wisdom about professional careers: **white-collar working professionals in developed economies are systematically underpaid by seven figures over the course of their careers relative to the economic value they create.** Drawing on five decades of economics research, we document five independent mechanisms—productivity-compensation decoupling, labor market concentration, declining professional share of income, value creation-capture asymmetry, and AI-driven acceleration—that collectively generate this gap. For a typical professional earning \$75,000 annually with standard 4% nominal raises over a 30-year career, the productivity-compensation gap alone generates approximately \$3.9 million in uncaptured nominal dollars. When additional structural mechanisms are considered, the total gap widens further. This is not a normative claim about what professionals "deserve," but an empirical observation about structural market failures that prevent competitive pricing of professional talent.

A note on dollar figures in this brief: Unless otherwise stated, all projected career figures are presented in nominal (non-inflation-adjusted) dollars. Because these projections extend 30 years into the future, inflation will significantly erode the purchasing power of these amounts. A dollar earned in 2055 will buy considerably less than a dollar today. The value of these projections is not in the precise dollar amounts—which will feel smaller in real terms than they appear on paper—but in the *relative scale* of the gap between what professionals earn and what the data suggests they would earn if compensation had tracked productivity. That ratio holds regardless of the price level.

Introduction: The Uncomfortable Arithmetic

How much do Americans earn over a lifetime? While a million dollars seems like a lot of money, it is actually within reach of most Americans' lifetime earnings. According to Georgetown University's Center on Education and the Workforce, citing data from the American Community Survey, the median lifetime earnings for all workers across all education levels between ages 25–64 is approximately \$1.7 million in 2009 dollars (Carnevale, Rose & Cheah, 2011). When adjusted for inflation, this is approximately \$2.6 million in 2026 dollars.

White-collar working professionals—who typically hold a minimum of a bachelor's degree or higher—also have higher occupational lifetime earnings than blue-collar or service industry workers. Healthcare professionals can have lifetime earnings exceeding \$10 million, and tech sector engineers and scientists average between \$3 million and \$5 million (Carnevale, Rose & Cheah, 2011). Taking the tech field as an example, when adjusted for inflation from 2009 to 2026, this can mean lifetime earnings of \$4.6 million to \$7.7 million. A financial manager with a bachelor's degree can earn lifetime earnings of \$3.08 million, equivalent to approximately \$4.74 million in today's

dollars. The seven-figure lifetime earnings are thus not out of reach for most white-collar professionals who start with high five-figure or six-figure annual salaries.

The question, then, is: for lifetime value capture of seven figures, how much value do the workers actually create?

Research in organizational economics consistently shows that knowledge workers create returns of 3–5x their compensation costs (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu & Kochhar, 2001). If we apply even the conservative end of this range, a financial manager who takes home \$4.74 million in today's dollars created \$14.22 million to \$23.7 million of theoretical lifetime value for their employers—a difference of \$9.48 million to \$18.96 million. This seven-figure gap is not the result of conspiracy or coordinated wage suppression. It emerges from structural features of modern professional employment that economists have documented with increasing alarm since the 1970s. It describes a situation in which what workers capture in their lifetime take-home earnings is far less than the value they create—which prompts the question: how much are workers being underpaid relative to their value creation?

What follows is an examination of these mechanisms, grounded in peer-reviewed research from economics' most prestigious journals.

A note on terminology: Much of the economics literature uses terms like "labor," "workers," and "hourly wages"—language that may sound like it applies only to factory floors or hourly positions. It does not. The Bureau of Labor Statistics category "production and nonsupervisory workers" includes accountants, analysts, engineers, programmers, consultants, and marketing managers—approximately 80% of the workforce (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics). The key exclusion is executives and senior management. When economists measure the gap between productivity and compensation, they are measuring what happened to the professional class that creates the bulk of organizational value but sits below the C-suite.

I. The Productivity-Compensation Decoupling

The Core Finding

The most thoroughly documented mechanism is what Stansbury and Summers (2020) call the "declining worker power hypothesis." Their Brookings Institution paper demonstrates that professional talent markets do not efficiently price skills: from 1979 to 2019, economy-wide net productivity—the total value of goods and services produced per hour of work, after accounting for the wear and tear on equipment and buildings—grew 59.7% while the hourly compensation of the typical (median) worker grew by a mere 15.8%—a 43.9 percentage point divergence (Stansbury & Summers, 2020).

Productivity grew by roughly 60%. Compensation grew by roughly 16%. For 40 years.

This is not a story about assembly lines. Productivity measures output per hour worked across the entire economy—including the output of financial analysts building models, software engineers shipping code, consultants delivering recommendations, and marketers driving revenue. When productivity rises, it is because professionals are creating more value per hour. The question is: who captured that additional value?

The Historical Context: When Professionals Shared in Growth

The relationship between productivity and professional compensation was not always broken. Between 1948 and 1973, economy-wide productivity rose by 96.7% and compensation for typical workers rose in near-lockstep by 91.3%—a correlation that underpinned the expansion of the American middle class and validated the neoclassical economic theory that real wages should track marginal productivity (Economic Policy Institute, Productivity-Pay Tracker, 2025; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011).

This alignment was institutionalized through what economists call the postwar social contract—an era often traced to Walter Reuther's "Treaty of Detroit" (the 1950 UAW–General Motors five-year contract), which normalized a compensation package combining cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to protect real wages and an "annual improvement factor" (AIF)—a regular raise meant to reflect expected productivity growth (Levy & Temin, 2007). This model spread beyond manufacturing and became the de facto standard for the broader economy. Compensation structures assumed that when firms became more profitable—when professionals delivered more value—salaries would rise accordingly. Annual raises were not charity; they reflected the expectation that employees would share in the productivity gains they generated.

The 1979 Turning Point

The Economic Policy Institute tracks this divergence with precision. Their Productivity-Pay Tracker, updated through Q3 2025, presents both metrics as an index starting at 100 in 1948. An index is simply a way to compare growth over time: if productivity starts at 100 and rises to 412, that means output per hour has grown 312% since 1948. If compensation starts at 100 and rises to only 254, that means pay has grown just 154%. The index makes the divergence visually and mathematically obvious—you can immediately see that the two lines started together and then split apart. Economists use indexes rather than raw dollar amounts because they cleanly isolate how fast each measure grew, regardless of the starting level.

Productivity here measures net output per hour worked across the entire economy. Compensation captures average hourly compensation (wages plus benefits) for production and nonsupervisory workers—approximately 80% of the workforce, excluding executives and senior management. Both are measured hourly rather than annually because this isolates the true rate of pay from variations in hours worked—if people work fewer hours per year but earn more per hour, that is a meaningful difference that annual figures would obscure.

Metric	Q3 2025 Index Value (Year 1948 = 100)	What It Means
Productivity	412.3	Output per hour has grown 312% since 1948
Typical Worker Compensation	253.6	Pay per hour has grown only 154% since 1948

Source: Economic Policy Institute, Productivity-Pay Tracker, updated Q3 2025.

The critical finding is the 1979 structural break. Before 1979, productivity and compensation grew in near-lockstep. After 1979, they sharply diverged:

Period	Productivity Growth	Compensation Growth	Ratio
1948–1979	2.5% / year	2.1% / year	~1:1
1979–2025	1.4% / year	0.6% / year	2.3:1

Source: Economic Policy Institute, *Productivity-Pay Tracker*, updated Q3 2025.

Over the full 1979–2025 period, productivity increased 90.2% while typical compensation rose just 33.0%—productivity grew 2.7 times faster than pay. This 57-point gap represents income that flowed to top executives and capital owners instead of the professionals who generated it (Economic Policy Institute, 2025).

What Caused the Decoupling?

Three reinforcing forces converged in the late 1970s and 1980s to permanently sever the productivity-compensation link for professionals:

Monetary Policy Shift (1979): By the late 1970s, the United States was gripped by "stagflation"—stagnant growth paired with 14% inflation—fueled in part by a "wage-price spiral" in which organized labor's robust bargaining power drove successive rounds of wage and price increases (St. Louis Fed, 2005). On October 6, 1979, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker introduced a radical monetary policy reform, abandoning the traditional practice of targeting interest rates in favor of directly controlling the money supply to break this cycle (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2004). The resulting "Volcker Shock" drove the prime lending rate past 21% and deliberately induced back-to-back recessions in 1980 and 1981–1982, eliminating 2.4 million manufacturing jobs between 1979 and 1983 (Henwood, 2016). While this policy successfully broke inflation, it permanently weakened worker bargaining power: faced with mass layoffs and plant closures, unions abandoned demands for wage growth in favor of mere job preservation. The share of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements fell from 27% in 1979 to just 11.6% by 2019, and research demonstrates that this erosion alone lowered the median hourly wage by \$1.56—a 7.9% decline (Economic Policy Institute, 2021). Crucially, the Volcker era established a lasting macroeconomic orthodoxy anchored in the concept of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU)—the theoretical unemployment rate below which inflation accelerates. Central banks would henceforth prioritize price stability over full employment, preemptively raising interest rates whenever labor markets tightened enough for workers to demand raises—ensuring that compensation growth would be systematically constrained even as productivity accelerated (Economic Policy Institute, *Productivity-Pay Gap*).

Shareholder Primacy Doctrine: For roughly half a century after the Great Depression, American corporations operated under "managerial capitalism," wherein executives viewed themselves as trustees balancing the interests of shareholders, employees, and customers—using profits to fund steady wage increases, defined-benefit pensions, and internal promotion tracks (Stout, 2012). This social contract was destroyed by Milton Friedman's influential 1970 essay "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits," which argued that corporate executives have a singular fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder returns, and that diverting funds to workforce investment was tantamount to an unauthorized tax on shareholders (Friedman, 1970). By the 1980s, institutional investors and corporate raiders forced this doctrine into practice, publicly condemning managers who retained earnings for workforce investment as maintaining "administrative slack" and pressuring a shift from "retain-and-reinvest" to "downsize-and-distribute"—dismantling pensions, slashing benefits, and channeling surplus into stock buybacks and dividends (Lazonick, 2014). The adoption of SEC Rule 10b-18 in 1982 provided a "safe harbor" for share repurchases that had previously been considered potential market manipulation, unleashing a colossal diversion of capital: between 2004 and 2013, the 248 continuously listed S&P 500 companies

devoted 84% of net income to shareholder distributions—47% to buybacks and 37% to dividends—while between 2000 and 2017, U.S. corporations spent nearly \$10 trillion buying back their own shares (Lazonick, 2015; NBER, 2020). Shareholder primacy structurally guaranteed that the wealth generated by rising professional productivity would bypass workers' paychecks entirely, flowing instead into the portfolios of the investor class.

Executive Compensation Restructuring: Prior to the 1980s, CEOs were compensated like senior bureaucrats—primarily through fixed salaries and cash bonuses—earning a modest 20 times typical worker pay in 1965 (Mishel & Kandra, 2024). The shareholder primacy doctrine brought with it "Agency Theory" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)—the economic framework positing that executives (agents) and shareholders (principals) have misaligned incentives, and that executive wealth must be tied directly to stock price to force alignment. Corporate boards adopted this prescription aggressively: stock options surged from 19% of executive pay in 1992 to 49% by 2000, accelerated by Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code (1993), which capped tax-deductible base salaries at \$1 million but exempted "performance-based" equity compensation (Edmans, Gabaix & Jenter, 2017). The result: from 1978 to 2024, realized CEO compensation grew by 1,094% while typical worker compensation grew only 24%, and the CEO-to-worker pay ratio exploded from 21-to-1 to 281-to-1 (Mishel & Kandra, 2024). Simultaneously, human resources departments adopted rigid salary benchmarking—using aggregated survey data from consulting firms like Mercer and Korn Ferry to pay professionals exactly the median "market rate" rather than linking compensation to individual or firm-level productivity (Cullen, Li & Perez-Truglia, 2025). This created a perfected dual-track system: unbounded, equity-linked upside for executives who captured productivity gains through stock appreciation, and strictly capped, aggregate-benchmarked wages for the professionals who actually generated the productivity.

Individual Career Impact

Consider a professional earning \$75,000 in today's dollars with standard 4% annual nominal raises over a 30-year career. Their cumulative career earnings total approximately \$4.45 million in nominal dollars. If compensation had tracked productivity since 1979, those same 30 years of earnings would total approximately \$8.37 million—creating a cumulative gap of roughly \$3.9 million, with the gap percentage widening from 38.5% at career start to 51.5% at the 30-year mark.

For context: the American Community Survey shows that tech field workers capture \$4–7 million in lifetime nominal earnings, and healthcare professionals (doctors and nurses) can capture up to \$10 million (Carnevale, Rose & Cheah, 2011). While the multi-million-dollar gap may seem large at first glance, it is important to remember that these are nominal dollars spread over three decades—inflation will significantly reduce their purchasing power. A dollar in 2055 will buy considerably less than a dollar today. The value of this projection is not the precise figure but the *scale of the divergence*: even after accounting for inflation, the cumulative gap between actual and productivity-justified compensation is measured in millions, not thousands.

The table below projects forward from 2025 using the same average annual growth rates observed over the 1979–2025 period: productivity at 1.4% per year and pay at 0.6% per year (both in real, inflation-adjusted terms). The "Gap %" represents the percentage of productivity-justified compensation that the worker does not receive. The "Actual Salary" reflects the worker's career trajectory with 4% annual nominal raises—this 4% figure represents a nominal raise that includes both a ~3% inflation adjustment and ~1% real merit increase, which is broadly consistent with the 0.6% real compensation growth rate observed in the EPI data once compounding is accounted

for. The "Should-Be Salary" shows what that worker would earn if pay had also reflected their share of productivity growth.

A note on this projection: The approximately \$3.9 million figure is a modeled scenario, not a precise prediction. It assumes the post-1979 trend continues at the same rate for 30 years—which may overstate or understate the actual trajectory depending on future policy, technology, and labor market conditions. All figures are in nominal dollars; inflation over this period will substantially reduce their real purchasing power. The value of this exercise is not the exact dollar figure but the scale it reveals: even under conservative trend assumptions, the cumulative gap is measured in millions, not thousands.

Year	Career Year	Gap %	Actual Salary	Should-Be Salary	Annual Loss	Cum. Actual Earnings	Cum. Should-Be Earnings	Cum. Salary Lost
2025	0	38.5%*	\$75,000	\$121,951	\$46,951*	\$75,000	\$121,951	\$46,951
2030	5	40.9%	\$91,249	\$154,396	\$63,146	\$497,473	\$825,784	\$328,311
2035	10	43.2%	\$111,018	\$195,455	\$84,437	\$1.01M	\$1.72M	\$705,244
2040	15	45.4%	\$135,071	\$247,410	\$112,339	\$1.64M	\$2.84M	\$1.21M
2045	20	47.5%	\$164,334	\$313,172	\$148,838	\$2.40M	\$4.27M	\$1.87M
2050	25	49.5%	\$199,938	\$396,414	\$196,476	\$3.32M	\$6.08M	\$2.76M
2055	30	51.5%	\$243,255	\$501,773	\$258,518	\$4.45M	\$8.37M	\$3.92M

* Starting gap of 38.5% derived from Q3 2025 index values: Productivity = 412.3, Pay = 253.6, gap = $(412.3 - 253.6) / 412.3 = 38.5\%$. Author's forward projections use 1979–2025 average annual growth rates: productivity 1.4%/yr, pay 0.6%/yr. All figures in nominal dollars.

Sources: EPI Productivity-Pay Tracker (updated Q3 2025); BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Labor Productivity (OPHNFB).

How this works: You start at \$75,000 in 2025 and receive a 4% nominal raise each year—standard career progression. The "Should-Be Salary" shows what you would earn if your pay also reflected your share of productivity growth. The annual loss grows over your career for two reasons: (1) your salary itself grows through raises, so the same gap percentage applied to a larger salary means a larger absolute dollar loss each year, and (2) the gap percentage itself widens (from 38.5% today to ~51.5% at the 30-year mark) as productivity continues to outpace pay. No investment returns are included—this is purely salary dollars you never receive.

Caveat: Economy-wide productivity serves as a proxy for white-collar labor productivity. The BLS does not publish productivity data by occupation type—productivity is measured at the industry or economy level, not by worker classification. This means we cannot directly observe "white-collar productivity" versus "white-collar pay." However, two factors suggest the economy-wide gap is a reasonable—and likely conservative—proxy for

professionals. First, the production and nonsupervisory category that EPI tracks already includes the majority of white-collar workers (accountants, engineers, analysts, programmers). Second, in sectors dominated by white-collar labor, the gap is demonstrably larger: in the Information sector, annualized productivity growth reached 5.0% versus 1.4% compensation growth between 1987 and 2015 (BLS Industry Productivity data). The economy-wide figure likely understates the professional-specific gap.

II. The Monopsony Problem

Defining Monopsony: When Employers Hold the Power

Before examining the evidence, it is essential to define a key economic concept. Most people are familiar with monopoly—when a single seller dominates a market and can charge inflated prices. Monopsony is the mirror image: when a single buyer (or a small group of buyers) dominates a market and can pay deflated prices. The term was coined by economist Joan Robinson in 1933 to describe precisely this asymmetry in labor markets (Robinson, 1933).

In labor markets, employers are the "buyers" of professional talent. When only a few employers compete for workers in a given occupation and geography, those employers gain monopsony power—the ability to set compensation below what a truly competitive market would produce. The economic mechanism is straightforward: in a competitive market, if Firm A underpays an engineer, Firm B poaches that engineer with a higher offer. But if only two or three firms hire that type of engineer in a given metro area, no competitive bidding war occurs, and all firms can pay below the competitive equilibrium. Workers in monopsonistic markets face a stark choice: accept below-market pay or exit the profession entirely.

Why the "Competitive Market" Assumption Fails for Most Professionals

Standard economic theory assumes that labor markets are competitive—that many employers bid for talent, driving wages toward workers' marginal productivity. What professionals actually face is closer to oligopsony—a small number of dominant employers with significant power to set compensation below competitive levels.

Azar, Marinescu, and Steinbaum (2022) tested this assumption directly, analyzing over 8,000 geographic-occupational labor markets using the near-universe of online job postings. To measure concentration, they used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)—the standard metric employed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to evaluate market competition. The HHI is calculated by summing the squared market shares of all firms in a market. It ranges from 0 (perfect competition with many small players) to 10,000 (a single firm controls the entire market). The DOJ and FTC classify markets with HHI above 1,500 as "moderately concentrated" and those above 2,500 as "highly concentrated"—thresholds above which mergers and acquisitions receive heightened antitrust scrutiny (DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2010).

Their findings are striking:

The average HHI across U.S. labor markets is 4,378—nearly double the DOJ's 2,500 threshold for "highly concentrated." This is mathematically equivalent to a market with only 2.3 competing employers. (To understand this equivalence: an HHI of 4,378 implies the same concentration as a market evenly divided among $10,000 \div 4,378 \approx 2.3$ equal-sized firms.)

60% of all professional labor markets exceed the DOJ's high-concentration threshold. If these were product markets—markets for goods and services—they would trigger antitrust scrutiny and potential enforcement action. But because they are employment markets, the concentration goes largely unaddressed (Azar, Marinescu & Steinbaum, 2020).

The Counterintuitive Finding: Specialization Increases Vulnerability

Conventional wisdom holds that specialized skills grant professionals leverage in wage negotiations. The data shows otherwise:

"There is no relationship between measured concentration and an occupation's skill level."
Professional occupations often exhibit higher concentration due to specialization and geographic clustering. (Azar, Marinescu & Steinbaum, 2020)

Consider specific examples of how specialization creates thin markets: Financial analysts in specialized sub-sectors—municipal bond analysis, quantitative trading strategies—face near-monopoly employer conditions outside major financial hubs. Software engineers with expertise in proprietary technology stacks face thin markets with concentration levels exceeding antitrust thresholds outside a handful of tech centers. Management consultants and corporate strategists cluster in headquarter cities; as Fortune 500 headquarters consolidate into fewer "superstar" metros, effective employer concentration rises for professionals outside those cities. Corporate attorneys in specialized practice areas—ERISA litigation, patent prosecution in specific technology domains—may have only two or three realistic employers in their geography.

The critical insight comes from Benmelech, Bergman, and Kim (2022), published in the *Journal of Human Resources*: high-skill professionals face higher switching costs and thinner markets for their specific expertise, making them potentially more susceptible to employer wage-setting power than generalists who can substitute across industries. A retail worker can move from Target to Walmart to Costco; an aerospace propulsion engineer has a handful of potential employers nationwide.

Quantifying the Compensation Impact

The econometric evidence—findings from statistical methods specifically designed to isolate cause-and-effect relationships in economic data, as opposed to simple correlations—is precise:

A 10% increase in market concentration is associated with a compensation reduction of 0.5% to 1.0%. A one standard deviation increase in HHI concentration—roughly the difference between a moderately competitive market and one dominated by two or three large employers—is associated with a 1% to 2% reduction in posted salaries. When using instrumental variables—a technique that isolates wage effects caused specifically by mergers and acquisitions, filtering out other factors that might confuse the results—the estimated wage impact rises substantially, with a one standard deviation increase in HHI associated with wage declines of 2.9% to over 14%. (Benmelech, Bergman & Kim, 2022)

Crucially, the negative effect is stronger for professionals with bachelor's degrees and in STEM fields—contradicting the "star talent" theory that assumes specialized professionals command competitive premiums. In industries with near-zero unionization rates—which describes nearly all of white-collar tech and finance—the wage elasticity with respect to concentration is significantly higher than in unionized sectors, meaning these professionals bear the full force of monopsony power without any institutional counterweight (Benmelech, Bergman & Kim, 2022).

Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline (2018) provide independent confirmation using matched employer-employee administrative data—government records that link individual workers to the specific firms that employ them, allowing researchers to observe the same worker across different employers over time. Their calibration indicates a markdown of approximately 20–30% between workers' marginal revenue product (MRP)—the additional revenue a worker generates for their employer from one additional hour of work—and their actual wages. In a perfectly competitive market, this markdown should be zero, as employers would bid wages up to MRP to attract and retain talent. The persistence of a 20–30% markdown is direct evidence that firms possess significant market power over professional labor. In plain terms: if you generate \$125,000 in revenue for your employer, competitive theory says you should be paid close to \$125,000, but you are actually paid \$87,500–\$100,000. (Card et al., 2018)

Five Mechanisms That Trap Professionals

Naidu, Posner, and Weyl (2018), writing in the *Harvard Law Review*, document the structural "cage" that sustains below-competitive professional compensation through five reinforcing mechanisms:

Non-compete agreements: Approximately 30 million American workers—roughly 20% of the workforce—are bound by non-compete agreements, with prevalence significantly higher among college graduates and technical professionals (FTC, 2024; Prescott, Bishara & Starr, 2016). By legally prohibiting moves to competitors for 12–24 months, these agreements sever the link between a professional's productivity and their outside options. An employer does not need to pay a competitive wage to retain a worker who is legally barred from accepting a higher offer. The FTC's April 2024 analysis estimated that eliminating non-competes would increase workers' earnings by \$400–488 billion annually over the next decade (FTC, 2024).

Information asymmetry: Employers aggregate compensation data across thousands of hires through proprietary analytics and third-party surveys; individual professionals enter negotiations with only their own salary history and anecdotal information. This structural imbalance allows firms to pay a professional's "reservation wage"—the lowest salary they will accept—rather than the competitive market rate that reflects their actual productivity. As Oyer and Schaefer (2011) document in the *Handbook of Labor Economics*, the very complexity of professional work makes it easier for employers to underpay, because output is difficult to measure objectively.

Firm-specific capital: A professional's institutional knowledge, internal relationships, and expertise with proprietary systems are valuable to their current employer but do not transfer to outside firms. This creates what economists call the "hold-up problem" (Naidu, Posner & Weyl, 2018): as tenure increases, the wedge between a professional's internal productivity and their external market value widens. The employer, knowing the professional cannot command equivalent compensation elsewhere, does not raise pay to match internal value creation. This functions as a "golden handcuff"—the more specialized and valuable a professional becomes within their organization, the wider the gap between what they produce and what they are paid.

Geographic constraints: Professional roles concentrate in specific metros. Family obligations, spouse careers, homeownership, children's schooling, and lifestyle preferences limit mobility, reducing the number of employers effectively competing for a professional's talent. The consolidation of corporate headquarters into fewer "superstar cities" (Autor et al., 2020) intensifies this effect for professionals outside major hubs.

Search frictions: Finding specialized roles while employed is costly and time-consuming. The difficulty of conducting a confidential job search while performing at high levels reduces competitive pressure on a professional's current employer. Unlike a product market where prices adjust in real time, the labor market for specialized professionals clears slowly and imperfectly.

Evidence of Explicit Coordination

The theoretical risk of employer collusion became concrete reality in the High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation (2010–2015). Court documents revealed that Apple, Google, Intel, Adobe, Intuit, Pixar, and Lucasfilm had entered into secret, bilateral "no-poach" agreements—explicitly agreeing not to cold-call or recruit each other's engineers. Executives including Steve Jobs and Eric Schmidt personally enforced these agreements, and recruiters were given "Do Not Call" lists (Naidu, Posner & Weyl, 2018).

The estimated impact: \$3.1 billion in suppressed professional earnings across 109,000 affected employees. The companies settled for \$435 million—roughly 14 cents on the dollar of the value extracted (Gibson Dunn economic analysis; settlement records, 2015).

This was not an isolated anomaly. Third-party compensation surveys—provided by firms such as Radford, Mercer, and McLagan—function as a more pervasive coordination mechanism. By allowing all firms to see the exact pricing of their competitors, these surveys enable what antitrust scholars describe as "soft collusion": if every firm targets the 50th percentile of the survey data, no firm needs to bid aggressively to discover the market price because the price is effectively fixed by the survey. In 2023, the DOJ withdrew decades-old "safety zones" that had protected such information sharing, explicitly acknowledging that exchanging competitively sensitive wage data can violate antitrust laws even when conducted through a third party (DOJ, 2023).

Individual Career Impact

For a professional whose competitive-market salary would be \$125,000, the 20–30% monopsony markdown documented by Card et al. (2018) reduces actual compensation to approximately \$100,000—a \$25,000 annual gap. Over a 30-year career with standard 4% annual nominal raises, this compounds to approximately \$840,000 in uncaptured nominal compensation. This estimate is conservative: it applies only the markdown percentage to the base and does not account for the compounding effect of percentage raises applied to a suppressed base.

III. The Declining Professional Share of Income

The Macroeconomic Shift

Zoom out from individual firms to the entire economy. The labor share—the percentage of total national income flowing to workers in the form of wages and benefits, versus the share flowing to capital owners in the form of profits, dividends, and capital gains—was long considered one of the most stable relationships in economics. Economist Arthur Bowley observed in the early 20th century that labor's share held remarkably steady at approximately 64–66% of GDP, a regularity that became known as "Bowley's Law."

That law has broken. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), publishing in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, documented that the global labor share has declined by approximately 5 to 7 percentage points since the early 1980s, dropping from roughly 65% to 58% of GDP. They attribute roughly half of this decline to the decrease in the relative price of investment goods—specifically information technology and computer capital. As technology becomes cheaper, firms are incentivized to substitute capital for labor.

Seven percentage points of U.S. GDP represents trillions of dollars annually. This is not money that vanished; it is money that shifted from professional compensation to corporate profits and capital returns. A professional's seven-figure career underpayment is the individual manifestation of this trillion-dollar wealth transfer.

Sector-Specific Evidence

The decline is steepest in knowledge-intensive industries where professionals generate the most value:

In **Software and Technology**, the labor share collapsed from 53% in 1987 to 30% in 2015—a 23 percentage point decline (BLS Industry Productivity data). The engineers who built billion-user platforms captured a shrinking fraction of the value they created.

In **Finance**, revenue per employee at major institutions routinely exceeds \$500,000, while median professional compensation ranges from \$150,000 to \$200,000. The surplus flows to executive compensation and shareholder returns.

In **Professional Services**, the shift from traditional partnership models to corporate ownership has redirected surplus from senior professionals to external shareholders. As Greenwood and Empson (2003) document, in the traditional partnership model the surplus generated by associates was redistributed to partners—an internal transfer within the professional class. Under corporate models, this surplus is diverted to external equity investors who may have no role in service delivery. The same work generates the same client value, but professionals capture less.

The Superstar Firm Paradox

Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen (2020), publishing in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, resolve an apparent paradox: professional salaries at elite firms (Google, Goldman Sachs, McKinsey) are historically high, yet professionals' share of GDP is falling.

The explanation: globalization and digital technology have created "winner-take-most" markets where a small number of "superstar firms" dominate their industries with extraordinary productivity levels and high profit margins. These firms operate with a lower share of value flowing to professionals than the firms they displaced. The aggregate decline in the labor share is not primarily because every firm is paying workers less—it is because economic activity is being reallocated toward these superstar firms.

A software engineer at Google earning \$300,000 is well-compensated in absolute terms. But relative to Google's \$1.5+ million revenue per employee, that engineer captures less than 20% of the value they generate. At a 1980s technology firm with lower profit margins, the same engineer would have captured 35–40% of revenue per employee.

You are earning more dollars while capturing a smaller slice of a much larger pie.

Individual Career Impact

The following table estimates the annual impact of the 7 percentage point decline in labor share on professional compensation at various earning levels, and the cumulative effect over a 30-year career in nominal dollars:

Professional Earning Level	Annual Impact (7% share decline)	30-Year Career Total (nominal)
\$75,000	\$5,250	~\$295,000
\$100,000	\$7,000	~\$393,000
\$150,000	\$10,500	~\$590,000
\$200,000	\$14,000	~\$786,000

Note: 30-year totals incorporate standard 4% annual nominal raises compounded over the career, consistent with the methodology used in Framework I. The 7% figure represents the approximate decline in labor's share of national income from ~65% to ~58% as documented by Karabarbounis & Neiman (2014). All figures in nominal dollars; inflation will reduce real purchasing power over the 30-year period.

This mechanism operates independently of the productivity gap and market concentration—it is a separate structural transfer from professionals to capital owners.

IV. The Value Creation-Capture Asymmetry

How Much Value Do Professionals Actually Create?

The previous three frameworks measure underpayment relative to historical norms, competitive conditions, or macroeconomic shares. But there is a more fundamental question: what is the actual economic value a professional generates for their employer?

Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, and Kochhar (2001), publishing in the *Academy of Management Journal*, examined this question in professional services firms. Their finding: knowledge workers create returns of 3–5x their compensation costs. This multiplier—sometimes called the "revenue-to-compensation ratio"—reflects the fact that a firm must cover not only the worker's salary but also overhead, capital costs, and profit margin.

This multiplier is consistent with how professional services firms price engagements in practice. A widely cited heuristic in professional services management is the 3–5x rule: a knowledge worker must generate revenue equivalent to 3 to 5 times their compensation cost to be profitable for the firm (Hitt et al., 2001). In this breakdown, approximately 1x covers the worker's salary, 1x covers overhead and benefits, and 1–3x is captured by the firm as profit. A management consultant billing \$500/hour while earning \$150,000 annually (roughly \$75/hour fully-loaded) generates a 6–7x multiple for their firm. A corporate attorney billing \$800/hour at a salary of \$200,000 generates similar multiples.

Compensation Level	Value Created (3x)	Value Created (5x)
\$75,000/year	\$225,000/year	\$375,000/year
\$100,000/year	\$300,000/year	\$500,000/year
\$150,000/year	\$450,000/year	\$750,000/year
\$200,000/year	\$600,000/year	\$1,000,000/year

Source: Revenue-to-compensation multiplier from Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu & Kochhar (2001), *Academy of Management Journal*.

Over a 30-year career at \$75,000 starting salary with 4% annual nominal raises (total nominal career compensation: approximately \$4.45 million):

Total compensation received: ~\$4.45M. Value created at 3x: ~\$13.4M. Value created at 5x: ~\$22.3M. Uncaptured gap: ~\$8.9M to ~\$17.8M (in nominal dollars).

A common-sense check: Not all of the uncaptured value represents "underpayment" in the traditional sense. Capital, infrastructure, brand equity, intellectual property, and management coordination all contribute to the value a professional generates—a consultant cannot bill \$500/hour without the firm's brand, client relationships, and support infrastructure. The 3–5x multiplier describes total firm revenue relative to labor cost, not the competitive wage a worker should receive. In economic terms, a worker's competitive wage equals their marginal revenue product (what the next hour of their work adds to the firm's revenue), not the firm's total revenue divided by headcount. The relevant question is not whether professionals should capture 100% of the value they create—they should not, and no serious economist argues they should. The question is whether the current 20–33% capture rate reflects a competitive market outcome or the result of structural market failures documented in Frameworks I through III. The evidence strongly suggests the latter.

The Marginal Revenue Product Gap

Marginal Revenue Product (MRP) is the economist's term for the additional revenue a worker generates for their employer from one additional hour of work. In a perfectly competitive labor market, economic theory predicts that workers should be paid their MRP—the wage should equal the value of the last unit of output the worker produces. If you generate \$150,000 in marginal revenue, you should earn close to \$150,000. Any persistent gap between MRP and wages indicates that employers possess market power.

Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline (2018), using matched employer-employee administrative data and robust econometric models, measured this gap directly. Their calibration indicates a markdown of approximately 20–30%—meaning workers are paid 20–30% less than the marginal dollar they bring into the firm. In a perfectly competitive market, this markdown should be zero, as employers would bid wages up to MRP to attract and retain talent.

The persistence of a 20–30% markdown is direct econometric evidence that firms possess significant market power over professional labor. For a professional earning \$150,000 who generates \$200,000 in marginal revenue, the \$50,000 annual gap compounds to over \$1.5 million in nominal dollars over a 30-year career (Card et al., 2018).

V. The AI Transformation

Artificial Intelligence Implications for Professional Compensation

The four frameworks above document historical mechanisms that have suppressed professional compensation since 1979. Artificial intelligence represents a structural transformation that threatens to accelerate and deepen these dynamics specifically for white-collar professionals.

Previous waves of automation—mechanization, computerization, and offshoring—primarily displaced routine manual and clerical work while increasing demand for cognitive labor. Generative AI appears to reverse that pattern by directly performing analytical, creative, and communication tasks that define professional careers: writing, coding, data analysis, contract drafting, financial modeling, and strategic synthesis. Knowledge workers—white-collar professionals once viewed as beneficiaries of globalization—now face direct exposure. As Dario Amodei, CEO of Anthropic, warns, “Up to 50% of all entry-level white-collar jobs could disappear within five years” (Eddy, 2025). Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin, and Rock (2023) similarly describe generative AI as a new form of skill-biased technological change, one that targets the “symbolic analysts” Robert Reich once identified as globalization’s winners.

Yet the magnitude of labor-market impact remains contested. BLS projections for 2023–33 indicate that even occupations considered highly exposed to AI are still expected to grow—software developers (+17.9%) and personal financial advisors (+17.1%), for example—while projected declines are concentrated in more routine roles such as insurance appraisers (−9.2%) and claims adjusters (−4.4%) (Machovec, Rieley, & Rolen, 2025). Employment levels alone, however, may obscure the deeper structural shift underway. Whether jobs expand or contract, the more consequential dynamic may be distributional: productivity gains are likely to continue rising faster than wages for many workers, widening the gap between output and pay.

The Productivity Paradox: Gains Without Proportional Compensation

Early evidence confirms that AI dramatically increases professional productivity:

Harvard Business School, MIT, and University of Pennsylvania researchers found that consultants using GPT-4 demonstrated a 40% improvement in performance quality and approximately 12% faster task completion compared to a control group without AI access. However, a critical finding emerged: when professionals relied on AI for tasks that appeared similar but fell just outside AI's competence zone—the “breakdown zone”—their performance dropped by 19 percentage points relative to the control group. This “jagged frontier” of AI capability means the productivity surplus is only accessible to workers with the deep domain expertise to discern where the frontier's edge lies (Dell'Acqua et al., 2023).

An NBER study of 5,000+ customer support professionals found AI augmentation produced aggregate productivity gains of approximately 14% measured by issues resolved per hour. However, the distribution was sharply uneven: the lowest-skilled agents saw productivity jumps of 35%, while the highest-skilled agents saw negligible gains (Brynjolfsson, Li & Raymond, 2023).

GitHub reports Copilot reduced developer lead time by 55% for routine coding tasks. However, a 2025 study focusing on experienced developers found a critical paradox: while developers perceived themselves to be 20% faster when using AI tools, they actually took 19% longer to complete complex tasks—time saved on writing code was more than offset by time required to debug and validate AI-generated output (METR, 2025).

The critical question is not whether AI increases productivity—it clearly does for many tasks. The question is: who captures these productivity gains? Historical precedent—the 45-year productivity-compensation gap documented in Framework I—provides a sobering answer. When professional productivity rose 90.2% since 1979, typical compensation captured only 33.0% of that growth. There is no structural reason to expect AI-driven productivity gains to be distributed differently. The same mechanisms that redirected post-1979 productivity gains to capital owners and executives—shareholder primacy, equity-linked executive compensation, salary benchmarking—remain firmly in place.

White-Collar Occupations Face the Highest Exposure

Task-level analysis reveals that approximately 19% of the U.S. workforce occupies roles where at least 50% of their tasks are exposed to automation by large language models (Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin & Rock, 2023):

Finding	Reported Value
Tasks completed significantly faster with direct LLM access	~15%
Tasks affected when including complementary LLM-powered software	47–56%
Workforce with at least 10% task exposure	~80%
Workforce with ≥50% task exposure (β)	~19%

*Source: Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin & Rock (2023), task-level exposure analysis mapping AI capabilities to O*NET occupational task descriptions.*

Exposure is heavily concentrated in high-wage, white-collar occupations—confirming that generative AI targets precisely the “symbolic analysts” who were once considered automation-proof. This is not a blue-collar displacement story. The professionals most at risk of having their productivity gains captured without proportional compensation are the same professionals this research brief addresses.

At the same time, adoption patterns reinforce this dynamic. White-collar workers are integrating AI into their workflows at the fastest rates; according to the latest Gallup data, frequent AI use is highest in technology (50%), professional services (34%), and finance (32%) (Pendell, 2025). The critical question, however, is whether this pursuit of productivity gains will translate into higher pay—or simply widen the gap between output and compensation.

The Emerging Bifurcation

PwC's 2025 Global AI Jobs Barometer documents an emerging wage bifurcation within the professional class:

Jobs requiring specialized AI skills—AI systems architecture, ML operations, prompt engineering at production scale—command a wage premium of 56%, up from 25% in 2024 (PwC, 2025). This creates a hyper-productive elite whose earning trajectory decouples from the broader professional class.

For the majority of professionals whose work AI augments but who do not possess specialized AI expertise, the pattern is different: firms maintain output with fewer professionals, or extract more output without proportional compensation increases. The economic logic is straightforward: if a mid-level associate using AI can produce the output of three associates, the firm has little incentive to raise wages for all three. Instead, firms tend to retain one worker—perhaps with a modest raise—and displace the other two, or freeze hiring entirely. The productivity surplus flows to the firm's bottom line, boosting the stock price and triggering equity-linked executive bonuses—precisely the dual-track compensation architecture described in Framework I.

This bifurcation means that AI does not uniformly suppress professional wages—it fractures the professional class. A small cohort of AI-specialized professionals may see compensation gains that outpace historical norms, while the broad middle tier of generalist knowledge workers faces intensified wage compression as their baseline cognitive skills are commoditized.

AI Intensifies Every Existing Mechanism

Mechanism	Pre-AI Dynamic	AI Acceleration
Productivity-compensation gap	2.3:1 ratio since 1979	AI productivity gains captured as profit, not wages
Market concentration	60% of markets concentrated	AI favors large firms with data and capital advantages, increasing concentration
Declining professional share	7 percentage point decline	Capital investment in AI infrastructure (\$155B+ in 2025) shifts share further toward capital
Value creation gap	Professionals capture 20–33%	AI enables extraction of more value per professional hour

Sources: EPI Productivity-Pay Tracker (2025); Azar, Marinescu & Steinbaum (2022); Karabarbounis & Neiman (2014); Card et al. (2018); hyperscaler capex reporting (Microsoft, Google, Meta, Amazon, 2025).

AI does not create a new problem—it accelerates the existing one. The structural architecture that has redirected productivity gains from professionals to capital owners for 45 years is now being turbocharged by a technology that

specifically targets professional cognitive output. For professionals entering or navigating the workforce in 2026 and beyond, the seven-figure gap documented in Frameworks I through IV is a floor, not a ceiling.

Addressing Objections

"Average compensation shows that compensation and productivity grew together."

Some analysts, notably James Sherk of the Heritage Foundation (2013), make this claim. The problem: "average" (mean) compensation is pulled upward by explosive growth at the top. When CEO compensation grows 1,094% while typical worker compensation grows 24% (Mishel & Kandra, 2024), the average looks healthy but describes nobody's actual experience except executives. The appropriate measure is median compensation or the compensation of production/nonsupervisory workers (80% of the workforce). Sherk himself concedes that "median compensation growth has not risen as quickly as average productivity"—which is precisely the point.

"But what about total compensation including benefits?"

Health insurance adds roughly \$8,000 annually. A 5% 401(k) match adds \$5,000–\$10,000. PTO value is \$8,000–\$12,000. Total: approximately \$25,000–\$30,000 per year, or roughly \$750,000–\$900,000 over a 30-year career. This closes approximately 10–15% of the value gap. Moreover, EPI analysis using total compensation (wages plus benefits) and applying the same price deflator for both productivity and compensation still shows a substantial and persistent divergence post-1979 (Economic Policy Institute, 2025). The benefits argument cannot explain why capital owners successfully captured the returns from cheaper investment goods while labor did not.

"Isn't this just class warfare rhetoric?"

No. The research cited in this brief is drawn from the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *American Economic Review*, *Journal of Human Resources*, *Harvard Law Review*, and the Brookings Institution. Lawrence Summers is a former U.S. Treasury Secretary, not a radical. Lucian Bebchuk holds an endowed chair at Harvard Law School. This is empirics, not ideology.

"What about equity compensation?"

Early-stage employees receive equity—typically 0.1–0.3% for employee #50. If the company reaches \$10 billion in valuation, 0.2% is worth \$20 million. But research shows these employees contribute value worth \$100–200 million to that outcome (Babina & Howell, 2018). Equity narrows the gap for a fortunate minority but does not eliminate it—and the vast majority of white-collar professionals work at established firms where equity grants are modest and do not fundamentally alter the compensation-to-value-creation ratio.

"Don't competitive markets set fair compensation?"

Only if markets are actually competitive. The evidence shows they are not: 60% of professional labor markets exceed antitrust concentration thresholds (Azar, Marinescu & Steinbaum, 2020), approximately 30 million professionals are bound by non-competes (FTC, 2024), firms have been caught in explicit no-poach conspiracies (High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, 2015), compensation surveys function as coordination mechanisms (DOJ,

2023), and workers face a persistent 20–30% markdown below their marginal revenue product (Card et al., 2018). The "competitive market" that would set fair compensation is, for most professionals, a theoretical construct rather than an empirical reality.

"Isn't wage stagnation explained by globalization and expanded labor supply, not employer power?"

Globalization and immigration have expanded the effective labor supply for some occupations, and this has placed downward pressure on wages in tradable sectors. However, the productivity-compensation gap persists across both tradable and non-tradable sectors, including domestically anchored professions like healthcare, law, and local financial services. Moreover, the decoupling is not unique to the United States—it has occurred across the vast majority of OECD countries with very different immigration and trade profiles (OECD, 2017). If globalization were the primary driver, we would expect the gap to be concentrated in trade-exposed occupations. It is not. Stansbury and Summers (2020) explicitly test for and reject the hypothesis that trade and technology alone explain the divergence, finding that declining worker power is the more robust explanation.

"Capital bears risk. Isn't some surplus transfer justified compensation for that risk?"

Yes. Shareholders and firm owners absorb downside risk—the possibility that the firm loses money—and a portion of the surplus reasonably compensates that risk-bearing function. This is why Framework IV explicitly acknowledges that the 3–5x revenue multiple includes capital's legitimate share and should not be interpreted as the competitive wage. However, the risk-bearing argument does not explain the magnitude or trajectory of the shift. Capital's share of income was stable for decades when risk-bearing was equally present. What changed after 1979 was not the nature of risk but the institutional structures governing surplus distribution: weakened unions, shareholder primacy doctrine, equity-linked executive compensation, and the deregulation of stock buybacks. The risk premium does not require—and cannot explain—a seven-percentage-point decline in labor's share of GDP.

"Remote work reduces geographic monopsony—doesn't that solve the concentration problem?"

Partially, and increasingly so. Remote work does expand the effective labor market for some professionals, reducing geographic concentration. However, several countervailing forces limit this correction. First, many professional roles still require in-person presence or hybrid arrangements, preserving geographic constraints. Second, remote work also enables employers to access global talent pools, creating wage competition with lower-cost jurisdictions—which can suppress rather than raise wages for domestic professionals. Third, as firms adopt proprietary AI tools and internal systems, firm-specific human capital lock-in (Framework II) intensifies regardless of geography. The net effect of remote work on monopsony power is ambiguous and likely varies significantly by occupation and seniority level.

"Won't AI increase labor demand for complementary roles, not just suppress wages?"

It may. Historical technology transitions have ultimately created more jobs than they destroyed, though often after painful adjustment periods. However, the relevant question for this analysis is not whether AI creates new roles—it almost certainly will—but whether the productivity gains from AI augmentation will flow to the professionals using the tools or to the capital owners deploying them. The 45-year historical record documented in Framework I shows that productivity gains have consistently been captured by capital and executives, not by the workers generating them. The institutional mechanisms that produced this outcome—shareholder primacy, equity-linked executive pay, salary benchmarking—remain firmly in place and apply equally to AI-augmented productivity. AI may create new categories of well-compensated work, but absent structural change in how surplus is distributed, the default outcome is acceleration of the existing pattern.

Summary: The Full Picture

The five frameworks documented above operate simultaneously over a professional career. The following table estimates the cumulative impact of each mechanism over a 30-year career at three starting salary levels, assuming standard 4% annual nominal raises. All figures are in nominal dollars; inflation over the projection period will reduce their real purchasing power. Where the underlying research provides a range of estimates (e.g., 20–30% MRP markdown), projections use the lower-bound or conservative specification unless otherwise noted.

Underpayment Mechanism	\$75K Start	\$100K Start	\$150K Start	Source
Productivity-compensation gap (Framework I)	~\$3.92M	~\$5.23M	~\$7.84M	EPI Productivity-Pay Tracker (2025)
Market concentration / MRP markdown (Framework II)	~\$840K	~\$1.12M	~\$1.68M	Card et al. (2018); Benmelech et al. (2022)
Declining professional share (Framework III)	~\$295K	~\$393K	~\$590K	Karabarbounis & Neiman (2014)
Value creation gap at 3x (Framework IV)	~\$8.9M	~\$11.9M	~\$17.8M	Hitt et al. (2001)

A critical note on interpretation: These mechanisms are not independent and should not be simply added together. The productivity-compensation gap (Framework I) is the broadest measure—it captures the total divergence between what workers produce and what they receive. Market concentration (Framework II) and declining labor share (Framework III) are among the *causes* of that divergence—they explain *why* the gap exists, not additional layers on top of it. They are multiple lenses on the same structural shift in bargaining power, not separate damages. The value creation gap (Framework IV) measures something different: total firm revenue relative to labor cost, which includes the legitimate share that accrues to capital, infrastructure, and management—it is context for the scale of value professionals generate, not an additional claim of underpayment.

The most defensible single estimate of career underpayment is the productivity-compensation gap from Framework I: approximately \$3.9 million in nominal dollars over a 30-year career for a professional starting at \$75,000—presented as a modeled scenario under trend assumptions, not a precise prediction. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, this figure would be substantially smaller, though still well into seven-figure territory. Frameworks II and III help explain the structural mechanisms driving that gap. Framework IV provides the broader context of total value creation. Framework V suggests the gap will widen for future cohorts absent institutional change.

The point is not a precise dollar figure. The point is that the cumulative divergence between productivity and pay—measured conservatively using economy-wide data that likely understates the professional-specific gap—is measured in the millions over a full career.

Conclusion: Information, Not Victimhood

The purpose of this research brief is not to argue that professionals are victims. It is to make visible what the data already shows: that **structural shifts in monetary policy, corporate governance, executive compensation, labor market concentration, and technological change have collectively redirected trillions of dollars in productivity gains away from the professionals who generated them**—and that these shifts were the product of specific institutional choices, not inevitable economic laws. The gap between what professionals earn and what they create is not a rounding error or a philosophical abstraction. It is measured in the millions over a full career, it is documented across five decades of peer-reviewed research, and it is accelerating. Understanding the architecture of this divergence is the first step toward changing it—whether through individual negotiation, collective action, or structural reform. You do not need to feel underpaid to be underpaid. You only need to understand the distance between the value you create and the compensation you capture.

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About Lossdog:

Lossdog is the first wealth optimizer AI-powered platform that precisely calculates a professional's true market worth and enhances their investment portfolio for maximum returns. Founded by the visionary creators of thinkorswim and tastytrade, Lossdog combines advanced data intelligence with decades of financial market innovation to deliver exact salary insights, not ranges, and personalized portfolio strategies. The platform empowers working professionals to identify and capture hidden compensation opportunities and untapped investment performance.

Headquartered in Chicago, IL, Lossdog also operates the Lossdog Network, a digital streaming platform featuring original financial and career content, including One Lucky Dog LIVE!, a Monday through Thursday morning call-in show hosted by Tom Sosnoff and Scott Sheridan and available at lossdog.com and on the: [Lossdog YouTube channel](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC...).

Tom Sosnoff, founder and CEO, began his career on the CBOE floor in 1981, where he spent two decades as a market maker, money manager, and running a prop trading firm. In 1999, he co-founded thinkorswim, a new broker-dealer and the leading options boutique in the US. The thinkorswim platform provided retail traders with professional-grade analytics and HFT execution tools. The company went public in 2007 and was acquired by TD Ameritrade in 2009 for \$750M. Following the acquisition, Sosnoff co-founded tastytrade in late 2010. tastytrade quickly became the largest streaming digital network for finance. In 2017, tasty launched a next-generation brokerage platform offering the industry's most advanced derivative trading technology. IG Group acquired tastytrade in 2021 for \$1.1B.

Scott Sheridan, co-founder, started trading options on the CBOE floor in 1986. Made markets in the OEX pit. Built thinkorswim—sold to TD Ameritrade in 2009. Built tastytrade—sold to IG Group in 2021. Thirty years empowering retail traders. Now he's taking the same fight to a bigger rigged game: your salary.

Jeff Joseph, chief strategist, has built and led financial enterprises for 40 years. His career includes founding and leading entrepreneurial and institutional initiatives in investment fund management, venture capital, hedge fund due diligence, capital formation and financial media.

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